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I Introduction 
 
This paper has been written as a contribution to the current policy debate about the 
status of biotechnology for international development. As we move into the 21st century it 
has become clear that biotechnology is certain to play a key role in economic and social 
development throughout the world. Already its impact on agriculture, health and the 
environment has been noted widely in the relevant literature but this is nothing compared 
to the widely held expectation that this generic technology will revolutionise these and 
other sectors in the coming decades. However, biotechnology is also a two-edged sword 
in that its capacity to modify and alter the course of nature raises many questions of 
ethics and risk. Unless these are resolved its economic potential is certain to be 
compromised. And for developing countries in particular, therefore, such issues of risk 
perception and management have great significance. 
 
This paper sets out to clarify the complex issues involved in this debate. Section II sets 
out briefly the science and technology (S/T) policy agenda for Third World development 
before giving a short stylised history of biotechnology. It shows how what was at one 
time a well-recognised set of craft techniques for the traditional manufacture of food and 
drink (going back millennia in time) has become (over the past thirty years or so) a major 
science-based technology. Summary data on investment trends and institutional 
developments are presented. Section III takes the discussion up to the present in more 
detail by setting out the current issues as they affect two sectors, agriculture and health. 
Here, while there are many promises, biotechnology is under threat as a result of a 
series of well-publicised events associated with environmental impacts. Section IV turns 
to related questions of risk and summarises how these are dealt with in the literature. In 
particular it contrasts conventional formal risk analysis (based on probability theory) with 
the more recent idea of the “Precautionary Principle”, which has come into play as a 
result of the evolutionary nature of modern environmental impacts, and its popularisation 
following the UNCED Earth Summit of 1992. Using examples from Europe and the Third 
World it will explore these debates in the light of the recently signed Biodiversity Protocol 
signed in Cartagena, Colombia last year. Finally Section V will cover what this analysis 
means for appropriate public policy agendas in developing countries. 
 
II Biotechnology and Development 
 
(i) Science, Technology and Development 
 
The role of science and technology (S/T) in development has been through nearly half a 
century of debate and discussion. The end of the Second World War heralded a period 
of international optimism that combined the recognition of economic inequality with a 
determination that international action could reduce it substantially. And while the 
organisations created at the time (such as the United Nations and the big financial 
bodies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) probably had peace 
and stability as their primary focus [1]1, an important secondary element was the 
harnessing of S/T to economic growth and development. By the mid 1950s it was known 
that technological factors were probably the single most significant factor explaining 
rates of economic growth but how that related to investments in S/T was not at all clear.  
 
The early debates on this centred on the disjunction between modernisation and 
autarchic agendas. Initially the former held sway and many developing countries 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this point. 
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invested heavily in a public S/T infrastructure. This was made up of universities, 
research institutions and related bodies whose role it would be to "modernise" and 
enhance economic production. However, technology development did not follow this 
model but began instead to rely much more on foreign direct investment and technology 
transfer. Partly as a result, the tone of the 1970s became much more radical (in the old 
political sense) [2], technology being seen as a tool of exploitative economic relations on 
the part of corporations having their roots in the industrialised countries of Europe, North 
America and East Asia.2 However, more recently still the agenda has become much 
more complex and in a sense less narrowly political. Arguably this has a lot to do with 
rapid changes in globalisation on the part of international capital and technology. But 
clearly it has also been affected by the fact that some (formerly underdeveloped) 
economic systems have been able to benefit substantially from the import of foreign 
technology. The issue is now recognised as one of understanding in more detail the 
macroeconomic context and policy regimes that are beneficial in this regard. Science 
and technology can be a positive resource provided this context is suitable. The difficult 
question is to determine for each economic system what determines that suitability. 
 
Combined with this is the issue of how to deal with large and unproductive public R&D 
systems. As mentioned above, during the years following de-colonisation many Third 
World countries invested heavily in organisations whose function was to conduct R&D of 
relevance to economic development. The belief was that in some sense "investment" in 
public science would create possibilities for more rapid rates of innovation than would 
obtain from the interplay of market forces. We now know that such expectations were 
never likely to be realised, that their underlying assumptions were hopelessly 
oversimplified and that in fact relations between "science" and economic production are 
very complex indeed. Meanwhile, however, huge infrastructures have been created 
whose economic impacts are certainly sub-optimal and in extreme cases probably 
negative. Enormous sums of public money are tied up in unproductive assets including 
"human capital", the key resource for a dynamic economic system. At the same time 
economic production routinely accesses new technology from other sources (usually 
from productive enterprises in the industrialised world) [3]. 
 
Nowhere is this clearer than with respect to the major new technologies that are starting 
to play a significant role in economic change. Especially in areas like computers, new 
materials, telecommunications and biotechnology, so frequent and complex are the 
discoveries involved that it has become vitally necessary to keep abreast of their rapid 
evolution since they impinge on practically all areas of economic production. This paper 
concentrates on only one of these, biotechnology, though it should be recognised that at 
a general level some of the issues and debates may also be relevant to others as well. 
Already biotechnology is used extensively in agriculture, agri-business, pharmaceuticals 
and environmental management. And it shows promise of being able to deal with some 
of the major food security and health problems currently experienced by many of the 
poorer developing countries. At the same time it is, in its recent guise, a radically new 
technology whose adoption carries with it certain risks. How to manage biotechnology to 
ensure maximum social benefit at minimal risk is therefore high on the policy agenda of 
all countries, especially those in the poorer parts of the Third World. The remainder of 
the paper explores how this issue might be managed on the part of relevant public policy 
analysts. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Chapters 7 & 8. 
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(ii) Biotechnology 
 
According to Sharp [4] biotechnology is the "application of biological organisms, systems 
and processes to manufacturing or service industries". She goes on to point out that in 
this sense "biotechnology has been around since the New Stone Age when humankind 
first learned the art of cross breeding plants and animals, and of using yeast to leaven 
bread and ferment alcohol".3 This so-called first generation biotechnology was 
superseded around the turn of the 20th century by more systematic (second generation) 
efforts to use science to screen and categorise microorganisms that might have useful 
applications (penicillin being a good example). Throughout the first half of the 20th 
century biochemists and microbiologists strove to produce useful products but over this 
period Sharp shows how developments in hydrocarbon chemistry switched to the 
petrochemical sector and it was here that most innovations took place. 
 
The era of modern (third generation) biotechnology began in the early 1970s as a result 
of two major breakthroughs in molecular biology. The first was the discovery that a gene 
from one organism could be isolated and inserted into the genome of another. This 
meant that desirable characteristics could at least in principle, be introduced into a 
microorganism that had never had it previously. The second breakthrough was the 
discovery of techniques for fusing and multiplying cells (hybridomas). Taken together the 
impact was potentially revolutionary. Henceforth it would be possible to reprogramme 
microorganisms to act as small factories for the production of a wide variety of useful 
products. Sharp [4] points out that already by the early 1980s therapeutic proteins such 
as insulin, human growth hormone and Factor VIII (to treat haemophilia) were being 
manufactured on an industrial scale and biotechnology applications to agriculture were 
beginning to be appreciated also. In the same paper she presents a stylised account of 
biotechnology development through the centuries. It gives a clear description of the 
complexity of an evolutionary technology that started from empirical roots but has now 
matured into a science-based technology operating across many trajectories and 
products. Special note should be made of its systemic nature whereby constituent 
techniques and processes cut across trajectories and expand production possibilities. 
We shall return to this aspect below. 
 
Investment in scientific research and new information technologies contributed 
significantly to these developments. It is noteworthy that in the early stages, motivations 
and interests of scientists and scientific institutions (as opposed to industrial or economic 
demands) drove research and development (R&D) activities leading to the establishment 
of the biotechnology industry. Indeed developments in molecular biology rDNA and 
biotechnology had stimulated the entry of pharmaceutical and chemical companies into 
the field in the late 1970s. Chemical companies began to invest in biotechnology in 1977 
when they realised that biotechnology could be used to create new products for 
agriculture. By 1980 a number of multinational companies had made initial commitments 
to biotechnology and by 1983 things had changed drastically. Large chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies began to make heavy investments in biotechnology. This 
trend was accompanied by a rapid transition from Mendelian to molecular genetic 
applications in agriculture, medicine and industry.4  
 
                                                 
3 See p 218. It is difficult to understand why she has omitted agriculture from this definition since her 
subsequent reference to plant breeding is a clear inclusion of agriculture. 
4 Ibid. pp. 195-197 
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The 1990s have seen dramatic advances in our understanding of how biological 
organisms function at the molecular level, as well as in our ability to analyse, 
understand, and manipulate DNA molecules. The entire process has been accelerated 
by the Human Genome project, which has invested substantial public and private 
resources into the development of new technologies to work with human genes. The 
same technologies are directly applicable to other organisms, including plants and 
animals. This has given rise to the scientific discipline of genomics, which has 
contributed to powerful new approaches to identify the functions of genes and their 
application in agriculture and medicine. These new discoveries and their commercial 
application have helped to promote the biotechnology industry mainly in North America 
and Europe. Indeed several large corporations in Europe and the United States of 
America have made major investments to adapt these technologies to the production of 
improved plant varieties of agricultural importance for large-scale commercial agriculture 
[5]. 
 
In 1999 over 70 genetically modified (transgenic) varieties of crops were registered for 
commercial cultivation worldwide. These include new varieties of cotton, potato, 
pumpkin, tobacco, tomato and clove. More than 15,000 field trials have been undertaken 
globally. New genetic modifications of more than 100 plant species are growing in 
laboratories, greenhouses, or in the field, providing farmers with new agronomic traits, 
particularly herbicide tolerance and pest resistance that enable them to grow these crops 
more easily and profitably. In 1999 the global area under genetically improved crops was 
40 million hectares mainly of corn (maize), soya bean, cotton, canola (rappelled) and 
potatoes. Eighty five percent of this area is in North America (USA and Canada) and the 
remaining fifteen percent in developing countries notably Argentina, China, Mexico and 
South Africa [6]. 
 
Over the past ten years or so third generation biotechnology has become a growth 
sector in the industrialised countries of Europe, North America and Japan. Here the US 
in particular is clearly the world leader. In 1998 there were nearly 1300 specialist 
biotechnology companies employing some 153,000 people directly while sales of 
biotechnology products reached$13.4 billion (an increase of 17% over the 1997 figure. In 
addition the US has a strong research base with companies spending some $10 billion 
in 1998. Again in 1998 Monsanto alone allocated some $1.2 billion for biotechnology 
research while in the same year Novartis announced the establishment of its Agricultural 
Discovery Institute (for genomic studies) at a cost of $600 million. In the public sector 
similar sorts of investments are being made. Thus the National Institutes of Health 
allocated $15.6 billion in 1999 for basic bioscience research while the US Departments 
of Agriculture and Energy spend annually a further $2 billion [6]. 
 
(iii) Biotechnology and Developing Countries 
 
How has biotechnology impinged on the Third World? Here both the threats and 
promises are considerable. For example, on the one hand biotechnology promises the 
capacity to improve radically rates of growth of food production and of other primary 
commodities such as cash crops for export. On the other, there are dangers that new 
synthetic substitutes derived from biotechnology can drive traditional export products out 
of the market. Already companies based in the North can produce products like 
pyrethrum and artificial sweeteners without any recourse at all to traditional products and 
the chances are that this capacity will grow considerably over the coming decades. 
Similarly with the use of modern techniques of tissue culture. Wambugu et al. [7] shows 
how tissue culture has been used to promote the production of disease-free bananas in 
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East Africa. The potential benefits for many subsistence farmers are likely to be 
considerable. On a more industrial scale tissue culture is now being used to promote the 
production of export led high value horticulture crops such as cut flowers. On the other 
hand, concerns have been expressed in recent years regarding the way international 
seed corporations have begun to dominate agricultural production in many developing 
countries, for example through using genetically engineered seeds in a proprietary 
fashion. 
 
Particularly important here for developing countries is the status of agricultural 
biotechnology. Here the scale and scope of private sector investment has been growing 
drastically over the years. In 1985 of the total $900 million spent in agricultural 
biotechnology R and D by the public and private sectors, $550 million equivalent to 
almost two-thirds of total expenditures, was spent by the private sector. In 1990 
estimates indicated that global R&D expenditure in biotechnology by the private sector 
was $2.7 billion, slightly more than twice the $1.3 billion by the public sector.  More 
recent data on investment, and R&D expenditure show that there has been a drastic 
increase in the decade 1985 to 1995. It is estimated that investments by the private 
sector will grow at 12% per year to reach $34 billion by the year 2006 [6]. The 
development of biotechnology applications is capital intensive, requiring substantial long-
term investments, which often can be mobilised only by the private sector. Significant 
investment of the private sector in biotechnology clearly demonstrates the need for the 
public sector to forge linkages with the private industry in biotechnology R and D to 
access resources of the private sector. 
 
It is to enable the Third World to deal sensibly with such issues that many commentators 
have advocated building up biotechnology capacity in the developing countries 
themselves. At one level the argument is straightforward. So strategic is biotechnology 
nowadays that no country can afford to neglect it. However, at a deeper level the issue is 
by no means clear-cut since it begs the question "what is biotechnology capacity?" 
Essegbey and Stokes [8] show that capacity goes well beyond "laboratories plus 
scientists". Indeed in most African countries there is no real shortage of suitably trained 
scientific manpower in the life sciences (though there are equipment and related 
laboratory constraints). What seems to be mainly missing, however, in many cases are 
the entrepreneurial capabilities, supportive institutions and associated networks needed 
to translate raw scientific knowledge into economic production. It is this systemic 
competence that determines "biotechnology capacity" and that appears in very short 
supply. Clark and Juma [9] explore this point in some detail arguing that strategic links 
with carefully chosen types of production is probably a necessary ingredient in building 
such capacity. And there is an important role for government in helping to create and 
nurture such links. Essegbey and Stokes [8] conclude that Ghana has probably reached 
the stage at which the application of tissue culture techniques is feasible. But it is an 
open question as to whether real biotechnology "capacity" is yet present. 
 
III Current Issues. 
 
A. Agricultural Biotechnology 
 
Biotechnology has begun to affect agriculture in the following ways. Firstly it can provide 
at least a partial solution to the problem of feeding the world’s growing population. Even 
with improved food distribution and access, this cannot be achieved without dramatic 
increases in crop production. Converting more land for agricultural use is 
environmentally unsustainable. Genetic engineering has also opened up opportunities to 
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increase crop yields, reduce crop losses to insects, disease and post-harvest storage 
problems, and enhance the nutritional value of some crops. In addition, crops are now 
being developed to resist abiotic stresses, such as drought and soil salinity. This will 
allow increased crop production on marginal land, and therefore bring possible benefits 
to poorer rural areas. Finally biotechnology can contribute significantly to “agri-business”, 
for example by helping to make foodstuffs more attractive to consumers and otherwise 
contributing to the globalised food industry. 
 
(i) Genetically- Modified Crops And Food 
 
Genetically modified (GM) crops are produced as follows. Traditionally, new varieties of 
specific crops have been bred by cross-pollination of two strains, usually of the same 
species, in order to transfer desirable traits from each into the new variety. These traits 
might include higher yield, greater resistance to certain pests or diseases, slower 
ripening or better tolerance to drought or soil stresses. Genetic engineering allows the 
selective transfer of one or more genes that code for desired traits from one variety to 
another, which means that it is a faster and more accurate method of breeding new 
varieties. It also allows the transfer of genes between species, which cannot be achieved 
by traditional breeding. For example, some of the first commercial releases of GM crops 
were modified with a gene from a bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), which codes for 
a toxin against some crop pests. Bt insecticide sprays have been in use for several 
decades, and are approved for organic farming. However, introducing the Bt toxin gene 
directly into a plant genome raised many concerns about the genetic engineering of 
crops, and food products derived from them. 
 
(ii) Environmental Impacts of GM crops 
 
One of the major concerns about introducing GM crop varieties is the uncertain impact 
on the environment. One of the potential problems is that the novel gene might be 
unintentionally transferred by pollination to other plants, including weeds and also wild 
relatives of the crop species. Scientific research has shown that this is technically 
possible, but the potential long-term impacts this might have are still unclear. There are 
fears that such transfers could lead to the development of resistant ‘super-weeds’, loss 
of genetic diversity within crop species, and possibly even the destabilisation of entire 
ecosystems. This last concern also emerges from the specific application of Bt, where 
the genetic modification results in toxin being produced directly by the crop. 
Environmentalists argue that the toxin might unintentionally be taken up by non-targeted 
organisms, which might destroy populations of benign insect species. Much research 
has been done on the possible impact of Bt-engineered crops on the Monarch Butterfly, 
with inconclusive results. Laboratory results have differed significantly with those from 
field tests. So far, despite millions of acres of Bt crops being planted over the past few 
years, there is little empirical evidence that the populations of non-target organisms are 
decreasing in nearby areas. However, it is clear that some of the feared impacts are 
likely to be ecosystem-specific. As a result, field trial results in one country or ecosystem 
may not provide conclusive evidence of environmental safety for other countries or 
ecosystems. Greater understanding of how specific ecosystems work is needed. 
 
(iii) GM food and human health 
 
Concerns have also been expressed about the risks to human health of food products 
derived from genetically modified crops. This is particularly the case where novel genes 
have been transferred to crops from organisms that are not normally used in food or 
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animal feed products. Many who oppose genetic engineering suggest that this might 
lead to the introduction of previously unknown allergens into the food chain. Controversy 
was sparked when a gene from a Brazil nut was successfully transferred into a variety of 
soya, which was being developed for animal feed. It was confirmed that the allergenic 
properties of the Brazil nut were expressed in the soya. However, the counter-argument 
was that this case demonstrated the effectiveness of scientific testing for safety. The 
allergen was specifically tested for during the development process, and as a result of 
the positive results the product was never developed for commercial use. Scientists 
further argue that the structure and characteristics of known allergens are well 
documented, and that testing for possible new allergens is therefore relatively easy. 
 
Another fear about food safety is the possible production of toxic compounds resulting 
from genetic modification. Many scientists argue, however, that by introducing one, or a 
very few, well-defined genes into a crop, toxicity testing is actually easier for genetically 
modified crops. In traditional breeding, entire genomes, or parts of chromosomes are 
transferred, and this often requires a lengthy breeding process to remove undesirable 
genes from the variety being developed. The last major concern for food safety is the 
use of antibiotic resistance genes as ‘markers’ in the genetic transformation process. 
Some of the antibiotics used for this purpose are still used to treat human illnesses, and 
there is concern that resistance to the antibiotics could be transferred to humans and 
animals through food and feed products. However, no evidence of this has so far 
emerged, and scientists have now developed techniques to remove these ‘marker’ 
genes before crops are developed for commercial use. 
 
(iv) Who benefits from GM food and crops? 
 
Pro-biotechnology scientists and firms have pointed out that genetically modified food 
products have now been on the market for several years, without a single reported case 
of adverse effects on human health. Against this, it has been argued that possible long-
term impacts would not become clear for some years. Potential environmental impacts 
will be particularly difficult to predict, monitor and manage. As scientists readily admit, no 
technology is ever 100 percent safe. Potential risks must be weighed against potential 
benefits. Such risk-benefit analyses will be done at different levels: at a national level, by 
governments and regulatory agencies; at production level, by farmers and firms; and at 
the individual level, by consumers. The first group of GM crops introduced mostly yielded 
benefits for commercial farmers and private sector firms. For farmers, insect resistant 
and herbicide tolerant crops produce higher yields and lower costs in respect of chemical 
inputs. Profits accrue to the firms who developed the seeds. As a result, revenues at 
national level are boosted. Further, potential environmental risks might be offset against 
the environmental benefits of reduced agrochemical use and more efficient land usage. 
But for consumers, these early GM crops, and food products derived from them, the 
perceived benefits were not evident.  
 
(iv) ‘Terminator Technology’ and Farmed Saved Seed 
 
For developing countries the potential benefits for farmers may be inequitably distributed 
both a global and national levels. Large commercial farmers who can afford GM seed will 
profit from increased yields, but a significant increase in production on a wide scale will 
lead to a reduction in the unit price of the crop. For small farmers, continued production 
with conventionally bred varieties is then likely to result in a loss of income. An 
associated problem, which has been identified by many people, is the potential future 
application of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs), often dubbed ‘Terminator 
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Technology’, that would prevent farmers from reusing saved seed. The first GURT to 
become widely publicised was a technique that involved genetic modification of a crop to 
kill off its own seed before germination. Its first expected application was to protect seed 
that had already been genetically modified for a desirable trait, thereby providing 
technical protection for the seed company’s legal Intellectual Property Rights. Under 
intense public pressure, the firm developing the technology announced that it would not 
be commercialised, but research and development on other GURTs is on going in many 
organisations. One argument in its favour is that its use would prevent the accidental 
spillovers on to other germplasm in adjacent locations, thereby improving biosafety. 
People who hold this view argue that there are other mechanisms to assist the poor 
small farmer in developing countries [10]. The development and use of GURTs should 
not therefore be banned on poverty grounds such as this. 
 
Opponents claim that this technology would increase poverty amongst the poorest 
developing country farmers, who rely on the use of saved seed. Against this, it might be 
argued that this group of farmers could not in any case afford the original cost of the 
seed for crops and crops varieties that GURTs would be used for. This, in fact, might be 
seen as the real problem for small scale and subsistence farmers, whose lack of access 
to credit is often the reason why new seed is not bought each season. In fact, this 
inequitable situation already exists in respect of many hybrid crop varieties, which give 
relatively high yields, but where the original cost of seed is high, and the beneficial 
characteristics of the hybrid diminish with replanting of saved seed. Another of the GURT 
technologies under development would have a similar impact. This involves modification 
that would not prevent the use of saved seed, but would effectively remove the desirable 
trait for second and subsequent plantings. However, it has also been noted that in many 
cases there are historic and cultural motives for exchanging and replanting saved seed, 
and therefore any technologies that effectively prevent this will not be acceptable. 
 
(v) GM crops and food security 
 
A very important challenge for developing countries that hope to utilise biotechnology to 
address food security objectives is that the new GM crops may not be appropriate to 
their most urgent needs. Biotechnology firms are unlikely to address these needs unless 
they are commercially profitable, and this leaves a large gap for the public sector to fill. 
Bearing in mind that research costs are usually very high, new forms of public-private 
sector partnerships need to be sought in order that the benefits of biotechnology reach 
those who need it most. One promising new initiative has been the development of 
‘Golden’ rice, which has been modified to enhance its production of beta-carotene, which 
is metabolised into Vitamin A. This new variety has the potential to address the huge 
problem of Vitamin A deficiency in developing countries, which causes partial or total 
blindness in around half a million children each year. However, in the long term, there is 
a need for developing countries to build capacity to address their most urgent concerns. 
This includes building capacity to understand their own ecosystems, undertake risk 
assessments, and utilising and adapting existing technologies to priority applications. 
This applies not only to crop agriculture, but also to animal and human health, and the 
protection of biodiversity. 
 
B. HEALTH BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
Despite so much international attention on genetically modified crops and food products, 
genetic engineering in health has been the main focus for modern biotechnology for the 
past several decades. Today, the greater part of global research and development in 
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biotechnology, and the most cutting-edge applications of gene technology are related to 
health. A variety of biotechnological techniques are used in modern drug development 
and medical treatment. In some cases, for example, gene therapy, genetic engineering 
is the basis for both the process and the product. In others, gene technology is used 
simply as one tool in the development of new products such as pharmaceuticals. 
 
(i) Drug, Vaccines and Diagnostics 
 
The first biotechnology product approved for human healthcare was synthetic human 
insulin, which came onto the USA market in 1982. Since then, more than 170 
biotechnology-related drugs and vaccines have been approved by the USA’s Food and 
Drug Administration, of which 113 are currently on the market. Another 350 
biotechnology medicines, together targeting over 200 diseases, are in the later stages of 
development. Amongst those approved during the year 2000 are medicines to treat 
pneumococcal diseases in children, diabetes, cancer and haemophilia. DNA technology 
is expected to revolutionise vaccine development in the future. DNA vaccines have only 
recently started the testing process, but are expected to eventually replace other 
methods of vaccine production. To state it simply, conventional vaccines are made from 
either live, weakened pathogen (disease causing agent) or a killed pathogen. Vaccines 
produced using live pathogens confer greater and longer-lasting immunity than those 
using killed pathogens, but carry some risk of causing the full-blown disease to develop.  
 
DNA vaccines contain only those genes of the pathogen, which produce the antigen and 
not those used by the pathogen to reproduce itself in host cells. Therefore, DNA 
vaccines are expected to combine the effectiveness of live vaccines with the 
comparative safer of those based on killed pathogens. Several preventative and 
therapeutic vaccines for HIV are currently in early trials. DNA vaccines are likely to be 
more extensively available to developing countries than conventionally produced 
vaccines. First, the cost of DNA is low compared to producing weakened live organisms. 
Second, DNA vaccines are more stable at normal temperatures. Refrigeration costs can 
take up to 80% of a vaccination programme’s budget where conventional vaccines are 
used in tropical countries. However, there are still some uncertainties about the potential 
for vaccine DNA to ‘invade’ the host’s genome and possibly trigger genes relating to 
tumour development. There is therefore a great deal of caution surrounding the 
development of DNA vaccines at this time. 
 
Two key broad areas of modern biotechnology are now used in disease diagnosis. The 
first is cell fusion, which involves the production of self-replicating antibodies – 
Monoclonal Antibodies - for a specific antigen, or disease agent. Monoclonal antibody 
diagnostic tests have been on the market for several years and are now one of the most 
profitable areas of commercial biotechnology. These diagnostic tests are actually quite 
inexpensive to produce, and this presents opportunities for some developing countries to 
enter the international biotechnology market, and also develop diagnostics for diseases 
of particular local relevance where these do not yet exist. 
 
The second area of biotechnology used for diagnostics is DNA technology. DNA probes, 
which use isolated segments of DNA to ‘attract’ complementary gene sequences from 
pathogens, are already on the market. They are relatively cheap to produce, and are 
usually more stable in transit and in tropical climates, than conventional diagnostics. 
DNA diagnostics are likely to grow into a major product area in the future, due to the 
developments taking place on DNA arrays, which are also known as DNA chips, and 
micro arrays. Micro arrays allow the detection and analysis of thousands of genes in a 
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single small sample, giving the power of many DNA probes in one small array. Micro 
array technology is also expected to greatly increase the efficiency of drug discovery, 
though no drugs have as yet been developed using the technology. 
 
(ii) The Human Genome Project 
 
The Human Genome Project is an international research initiative, started in 1990, which 
aims to ‘decode’ the human genome. An almost complete map of the genome has 
already been produced, and sequencing is now expected to be complete by 2003, two 
years ahead of schedule. It is now estimated that the human genome has around 30,000 
genes. Many common genetic disorders are caused by defects in several genes. 
However, around 4,000 other disorders are now thought to be caused by a single mutant 
gene, including sickle cell anaemia, and cystic fibrosis. The Human Genome Project has 
identified many of these mutant genes. In fact, on average during the past two years, a 
new disease gene has been identified every day. It will take many more years to fully 
understand how all of the genes in the human genome work, but already the new 
knowledge generated by the Project has led to many developments in medicine. 
Furthermore, this new knowledge is in the public domain, and therefore freely available 
to scientists who are able to access it, and have the ability to analyse and use it. Future 
benefits will undoubtedly include improved drug and vaccine development. 
 
However, there are societal implications from this increasing ability to understand 
genetic variability in humans. Genetic screening and analysis of individuals may 
potentially lead to healthcare benefits to those individuals, for example, through tailor-
made treatment (see Pharmocogenomics, below) or opportunities to make lifestyle 
changes where the individual is genetically susceptible to certain diseases. But there are 
very real concerns that an individual’s genetic information may become available to 
organisations outside the medical profession, including insurance companies and 
employers. There are therefore concerns about loss of privacy, and genetic 
discrimination. 
 
(iii) Pharmocogenomics 
 
Pharmocogenomics is concerned with individual response to drugs based on genetic 
makeup. Finding the most suitable drug, and dosage, for a specific patient is done on a 
trial-and-error basis. Dosage is calculated according to the weight and age of the patient. 
Actual patient response, including processing and metabolisation of the drug, and any 
adverse side effects, is largely determined by their genetic inheritance. Understanding 
these processes through genetic analysis of individual patients is likely to lead, in the 
future, to more effective treatment and improved drug development. Treatments could be 
tailor-made for the patient, resulting in faster recovery, more cost-effective use of drugs, 
and a decrease in adverse reactions to some drugs. In drug development, it will become 
possible for new drugs to be targeted at specific groups that are able to metabolise them 
effectively and without serious side effects. This will mean fewer failed drugs trials, and 
less wastage of costly research and development where a particular drug is suited only 
to a niche market. Pharmocogenomics is a very recent, but fast-moving area of 
research, which is likely to revolutionise health care in industrialised countries in future 
years. However, questions must be raised about the feasibility and time scale for the 
benefits to reach most developing countries. Genetic analysis of individuals, and ready 
access to a wide range of drug options, will of course be prerequisites for take 
advantage of the opportunities offered. 
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(iv) Gene Therapy 
 
Gene therapy involves the genetic engineering of a patient’s genetic code to remove or 
replace a mutant gene that is causing disease. There are two broad types of gene 
therapy that are possible. Germ-line, or stem cell, gene therapy involves altering a 
patient’s DNA in their stem (reproductive) cells. The modification to their genetic 
‘blueprint’ is permanent, and hereditary. This type of gene therapy is complex, and is 
considered too risky to undertake until the underlying biology is better understood. It also 
raises many ethical problems, for example, the potential misuse of the therapy to create 
‘designer’ babies. At the moment, germ-line gene therapy is banned in many countries. 
The second type of therapy is somatic gene therapy. This involves engineering cells on a 
‘localised’ basis, without affecting the patient’s basic genetic 'blueprint’. The first such 
therapy was approved in 1990, to treat a four year old child who suffers from Severe 
Combined Immune Deficiency. Some of the girl’s white blood cells were extracted, 
genetically engineered in the laboratory, and infused back into her bloodstream. This 
successfully strengthened her immune system. Gene therapy techniques for cystic 
fibrosis have also been approved, and candidate techniques for the treatment of 
Parkinson’s Disease, Alzheimer’s Disease, and some cancers are under development. 
Somatic cell gene therapy is likely to become very important for the treatment of 
diseases caused by single mutant genes. 
 
IV Risk and Uncertainty 
 
(i) The Issue 
 
From Section III therefore, it can readily be seen that while modern biotechnology has 
great welfare potential is subject to significant concerns of ethics, morality and risk. This 
was recognised at a relatively early stage in Article 8 (g) of the Convention for Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which enjoins all signatories to: 
 
Establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks 
associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting 
from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts 
that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking into account the risks to human health5 
 
As Essegbey and Stokes [8] point out the risks are of two main types: “those associated 
with the contained use of biotechnological processes and intermediate products in 
laboratories; and potential risks and uncertainty of the impacts of biotechnological 
products when released into the wider environment”.6 However, while the former have 
been reasonably well catered for in most countries in terms of regulatory guidelines, the 
situation is not so clear-cut for the latter category. In the USA and Europe, risk 
assessment has been done on a step-by-step, case-by-case basis [12] and has co-
evolved with technology development, governance structures and management 
expertise. However, in many parts of the Third World the “international diffusion of 
biotechnologies is progressing at far greater speed than their original development, 
leading to fears that developing countries are, or soon will be, exposed to biotechnology 
                                                 
5 See Glowka et al [11] p. 45. 
6 Op. cit. p 35. 
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related risks which they do not yet have the capacity to manage.”7 The question then is 
how should they plan to cope with this dilemma in the best interests of development. 
 
(ii) Risk Analysis 
 
To understand the problems involved in risk analysis in relation to biotechnology it is 
necessary to take a step back in time. Science has always understood that technological 
and economic interventions are subject to risks. But such risks were seen as computable 
in the sense that values could be assigned to them. Decision-makers would then 
combine standard estimates of contributions to welfare with such risk values before 
making final policy recommendations. For example, the decision to introduce an 
innovation in crop production in a region would depend first of all on projected net 
benefits, which would be determined, say, through social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). 
SCBA typically values expected outputs and inputs to projects and computes a resultant 
“rate of return” to the relevant capital investments. But these estimates would then be 
adjusted to allow for factors preventing the expected costs and benefits being realised. 
The techniques used would vary but ultimately would rest on probability theory—that is 
by computing the likelihood of sub-optimal performance based on past events of a 
similar nature.8 The adjusted projected net benefits would be computed and the decision 
to go ahead with the intervention would then proceed according to some wider set of 
decision criteria (for example whether or not the adjusted rate of return to the investment 
exceeded some numerical percentage like the current social discount rate used by the 
national planning agency9). 
 
Of course it was always realised that such numerical forecasts would be imperfect. To 
take this into account a “safety” factor was often also added to allow for the possibility of 
“non-computable” risks. For example in the building of a new bridge, it would be 
accepted that despite over a century of bridge-building knowledge on the part of civil 
engineers, things could still go wrong. And therefore so-called “fail safe” factors would be 
included to allow for this. But (and this is the important point) ultimately the system in 
question was always seen to be computable in principle. It existed as an objective entity 
in reality, however hard it was to formulate it numerically in practice. As Thompson [14] 
has put it, the view is based on an acceptance of 18th Century Natural Law and the 
utilitarian ethics that followed from the Enlightenment. It is useful at this stage in the 
argument to distinguish between two criticisms of this view.10 The first is a systems 
criticism. The second one is an ethical one. 
 
On the first it is essential to realise that much of modern experimental science is based 
on the view that the system under investigation is relatively stable. This then allows it to 
be subject to experiment and characterisation in the sense that its parameters are 
computable.  Once we know these, we can predict with some certainty how it will behave 
in future periods. If you like we can assign probability values to future behaviour based 
                                                 
7 Ibid. p. 6. 
8 Thus formally a distinction is made between “risk” and “uncertainty”. In the latter whereas future states of 
nature are known there is not enough prior knowledge available to determine an exact set of probabilities. 
In such cases these would be estimated with aid of by “experts”, those who were trusted to know the state-
of-the-art and could make judgements with authority. This type of technique is sometimes called a 
Bayesian technique after the scientist who first suggested this statistical approach. See [13] for a discussion 
of the use of Bayesian formulae in relation to Third World science policy decisions. 
9 Alternatively where investment funds were limited only the high value projects would be sanctioned 
10 See [14] page 24, for a reference to John Stuart Mill in this context. 
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upon how the system has behaved in past periods. On the other hand if the system in 
question is evolving in terms of its underlying structure, then such a procedure is flawed 
simply because its parameters are no longer stable. Indeed its parametric instability 
increases in proportion to its rate of evolution. This need not be too much a problem in 
bridge building (bridges, and their immediate environments, are relatively stable 
systems) but is certain to be a serious problem in a field such as biotechnology subject 
to very rapid technical change. Here assigning probability values to, say, the impact of a 
GMO becomes impossible simply because the future “states of nature” are unknown. We 
live genuinely in a state of ignorance about the future system in question.11 
 
The second criticism is equally fundamental. For even if formal risk analysis could show 
that an intervention is likely to be relatively harmless there may still be important issues 
associated with values and ethics. Thompson, for example, shows how in the context of 
the GM controversy consumers became “deeply resentful of a marketing approach that 
denied them the opportunity to give or withhold consent. Even consumers who thought 
of themselves as potentially benefiting from GM foods nevertheless insisted upon the 
right to decide for themselves whether to eat it or not.”12 Tait [10] shows how throughout 
the 1990’s there arose increased resistance among many sections of European public 
opinion to the use of biotechnology to modify crop production. Some of this may have 
been “irrational” in the formal scientific sense but by no means all. The impact of “mad 
cow” disease in the UK did great damage to public trust of government regulation. It also 
called in question the relative inability of science to provide a coherent impartial 
judgement of such issues. Nor did the early attitude of industry help. Tait and Chataway 
[17] for example, show how “Monsanto’s response to European calls for a more 
precautionary approach to regulation was to mount a campaign of opposition”13. 
including a refusal to countenance “product labelling” as mechanism that might allay 
public concerns. And though much of the agro-biotechnology industry has now come to 
realise that a more inclusive strategy is probably necessary to deal with such issues, a 
great deal of damage has been done to their corporate interests. 
 
To re-cap, the application of formal risk analysis to biotechnology issues is twofold. 
Firstly it runs foul of the speed at which biotechnology is moving. And so has difficulty in 
making judgements that stand up to strict scientific scrutiny. Even the application of fail-
safe devices does not deal properly with the problem, not least because all too 
frequently scientists have been less that candid about the validity of their methods. 
Secondly, however, there are important ethical objections about the very nature of 
biotechnology interventions, and these concern the rights of the public to agree or not 
with them whatever may be the objective risks involved. Here many environmental 
groups have emerged in recent years to argue vigorously against the application of the 
biosciences to many aspects of economic production. And, as we shall see below, they 
are doing so to great effect not only in Europe but also in many Third World countries. 
 
(iii) New Approaches 
 
                                                 
11 Again more rigorously, a distinction should be made between “uncertainty” and “ignorance”. In the 
former future states of nature are known. In the latter they are not, in which case the assigning of objective 
probabilities becomes impossible. In the case of biotechnology change the level of ignorance is certain to 
be considerable. We are grateful to Mick Common for pointing out this distinction to us. Clark and Juma 
[15] explore these issues in respect of technology more generally. See Chapters 1 and 9. 
12 See op. cit. p. 25. Thompson also makes reference to Durant, Bauer and Gaskell [16]. 
13 See p. 6. 
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In order to deal meaningfully with the risks associated with modern biotechnology, 
therefore, a range of new approaches has been suggested and it is useful at this stage 
to summarise what these might be. Central to these is the notion of the Precautionary 
Principle, which began to emerge as an important conceptual organiser in the build up to 
the UNCED Earth Summit in the early 1990’s. Hence Common [18] quotes Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration as follows: 
 
In order to protect the environment the precautionary principle shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.14 
 
The Precautionary Principle is thus essentially a general injunction to decision-makers to 
postpone action where the environment is at risk but as Common [18] points out “it does 
not offer much in the way of guidance as to how the problem should be dealt with. To 
say that a lack of certainty should not inhibit measures to protect the environment from 
serious and irreversible damage does not indicate what should be done and how it 
should be done. Nor does the principle suggest how one might set about answering 
such questions.”15 Common goes on to discuss some recent proposed mechanisms 
designed to operationalise the Precautionary Principle like the adoption of a Safe 
Minimum Standard or the posting of Environmental Performance Bonds16 for project 
interventions. However, in both cases these are controversial and have been subject to 
criticisms even for well-defined projects. In the case of radical biotechnological change it 
is difficult to see how a specific decision tool of such types could play a useful role. 
 
Nevertheless it is clear that in many countries the Precautionary Principle is having 
practical influence. Tait [10] for example, shows how many European countries have 
now begun to take a much more cautious approach to biotechnology policy, especially 
with regard to the advent of GM crops. Her view is that the time has come to take the 
precautionary principle much more seriously than has been the case in the past. But this 
cannot be done through the simple application of the old risk-based formulae for the 
simple reason that we are now dealing with future events and our perceptions of such 
events and their implications. Here we are in a world of great uncertainty and ignorance, 
where views are influenced by economic, social, ethical and ideological interests, and 
therefore where decision-making has to be consensual if it is to be successful. Indeed 
one of the major problems faced by industry, science and government is that for many 
years each of these “estates” has refused to see the issue in this light and has therefore 
lost credibility in the eyes of ordinary people. Tait calls for a constructive dialogue among 
all interested parties so as to clarify the issues and reach a social consensus on all the 
underlying problems. This does not mean abandoning science. Rather it implies the 
need to recognise the limitations of science in a field that is developing very fast indeed. 
 
But how should this be done? The first step is to recognise who the interest groups are 
and what factors influence their views. Tait identifies the following: 
 
• Environmental pressure groups (ENGO’s) 
                                                 
14 See p. 213 
15 Ibid. p. 214. 
16 See also Perrings [19] 
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• Consumer organisations (CNGO’S) 
• Multinational companies (MNC’S) 
• Small scale industry (SME’S) 
• Farmers and farmer organisations (FO’S) 
• The public research system (and the scientists that work in it). 
• Government ministries and secretariats. 
 
Each of these interest groups generally view issues of biotechnology risk quite differently 
even where the presenting evidence appears to be very similar. But their views are 
neither static nor homogeneous. For example “unlike their American counterparts, 
several European companies would have been prepared at an early stage to accept 
labelling of food products arising from GM crops, avoiding one of the stimuli which has 
had an important impact on European public opinion.”17 Again Paarlberg [20] shows how 
agricultural and scientific ministries are usually much more promotional to biotechnology 
that are environmental ministries. And the views of European CNGO’s have certainly 
changed from a neutral position to a much more hostile position over the 1990’s as trust 
in regulatory authority has dissipated (Tait [10]). 
 
In a recent IFPRI publication Paarlberg [20] has analysed policies towards GM crops in 
four developing countries, Brazil, China, India and Kenya. Of these only China has been 
positive about granting permission for planting to go ahead. In each of the other 
countries international pressures from ENGO’s, CNGO’s and donors are working to 
discourage such developments despite the fact that government agencies in all three 
countries are much more positive towards GM crops. In China’s case, however, NGO 
pressure groups are simply not allowed to function. Interestingly enough Paarlberg 
concludes that the existence of IPR regimes is not by any means the main determinant 
of MNC behaviour in any of the countries. Monsanto, for example, has been offering to 
share GM sweet potato technology with Kenyan scientists for nearly a decade but has 
been prohibited on biosafety grounds. In China MNC’s have been quite happy to enter 
into collaboration agreements despite widespread and blatant IPR piracy. Conversely, a 
relatively strong IPR regime in Brazil has not in itself been enough to get a GM revolution 
going in that country (Paarlberg [20])18. Stokes [21] has come to similar conclusions in 
her study of Zimbabwean biotechnology policy. 
 
A related issue concerns international trade. Because trade in GM crops, for example, is 
subject also to the WTO agreement, in effect signing up to the WTO has constrained 
countries’ abilities to prevent imports of GM crops on grounds of risk and safety. 
Because of the importance of this issue the WTO has set up a Committee on Trade and 
Environment to deal with associated disputes. As Tait and Bruce [22] point out, however, 
the current WTO position is that such trade restrictions should be based on current 
internationally agreed food safety regulations and that if national standards are higher 
than these current Codex standards, “the additional safeguards must be based on 
scientific evidence and grounded in risk assessment.”19  In other words the WTO 
                                                 
17 See Tait [10], p. 184. 
18 See page 30. 
19 See p. 105. These standards refer to the Codex Alimentarius established in the 1960s by the FAO and 
WHO Tait and Bruce show that the Codex contains more than 200 standards for foodstuffs and in 1998 
membership of the Codex Commission comprised 163 countries representing 97% of the world population. 
They also refer to the Codex web site--- www.fao.org./docrep/w9114e/  
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position does not recognise the wider view of risks associated with biotechnology 
development as outlined above. 
 
V Public Policy for Biotechnology 
 
How then should Third World governments proceed with respect to biosafety issues 
given the promises and threats of modern biotechnology? We suggest that an important 
necessary condition is the building up capacity to understand biotechnology in all its 
aspects so that whatever regulatory/promotional regimes countries put in place are as 
fully informed as possible. And it is here that such countries are bound to confront a 
much more basic issue of S/T policy—the inability of traditional governance structures to 
fully understand the details of possible technology developments and hence to construct 
effective plans and policies to promote them safely. For while there are usually well-
trained scientists within national laboratory systems who are well able to understand the 
detailed nature of biotechnology they are often not well connected into decision-making 
structures at government level. At the same time the degree of “connectivity” between 
relevant S/T organisations is often not very good either. What this means in practice is 
that since “innovation systems” are not well developed, mechanisms for relevant 
governance are hampered by lack of knowledge. 
 
In turn this then allows different interest groups to exploit a confused situation to try to 
achieve advantage for this or that position, regardless of the objective situation. 
Paarlberg, for example, shows how the NGO sector in India has been able to stir up 
popular feeling against GM technology by playing on fears about the activities of 
international corporations. And this is despite the fact that in some cases the adoption of 
GM technology could have beneficial consequences. For example, India’s cotton factors 
are “plagued by bollworms that have become resistant to chemical sprays. Insecticidal Bt 
cotton presents an alternative method to control bollworms, yet efforts by 
Monsanto/Mahyco since 1997 to gain biosafety approval-------have repeatedly been 
slowed by NGO protests. By filing law suits---and by sponsoring physical attacks against 
field trials, anti-GM activist groups in India have transformed the biosafety approval 
process into a highly politicised—and at times paralysed--- policy struggle”.20 Thus an 
activity with clear development and environmental benefits has been stopped by 
pressure groups that ostensibly are working in the best interests of the environment and 
development. Nor are the battles confined to the NGO sector, for in Brazil disagreements 
between environmental and science ministries have clearly played an important role in 
slowing down biotechnology development, while in Kenya biosafety legislation has been 
heavily influence by donors whose views may not have been totally disinterested.21  
 
We would therefore recommend that countries take an approach similar to that 
recommended by Tait [10]. First of all national governments should recognise explicitly 
they are dealing with an extremely complex issue for which there are no simple 
solutions. Certainly they should not assume that they can issue directives from on high 
and wait for these issues to be obeyed uncritically. Secondly they should begin to 
encourage dialogue between and among all relevant stakeholders with the aim of 
clarifying the true nature of the issues and minimising degrees of misunderstanding and 
confusion. One good example of how this might be done is a recent attempt in Ghana to 
raise biotechnology awareness through the use of a “stakeholder conference”. In this 
case a donor-funded project brought together as many interest groups representatives 
                                                 
20 Op. cit. p. 19 
21 Ibid. pp. 15 and 12. 
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as possible with a view to setting priorities for biotechnology development in Ghana over 
the medium term.22 Led by a policy research organ from a key ministry the project team 
then went on to conduct research into how well such stated priorities are being met in 
practice, through an analysis of secondary literature and interviews with individual 
stakeholder groups. Finally a smaller feedback workshop was arranged at which results 
were discussed and disseminated. At the same time a newsletter was produced and 
disseminated as widely as possible so that all groups could feel they were part of this 
dialogue and could benefit from the resultant exchange of views. It is not difficult to see 
how the appropriate use of the Internet could enhance and promote such initiatives. 
 
Thirdly, countries need to do more to build up relevant S/T capacities amongst civil 
servants. As Paarlberg points out biosafety administrators are prone to err on the side of 
undue caution if they know that they will be subject to NGO and media criticism. This has 
certainly been the case in Kenya where the drafting of policies has proceeded much 
faster than the capacity to administer the resulting decisions. Indeed donors have an 
important role to play here since they are apparently much readier to fund the drafting of 
biosafety policies that the building up of necessary implementation capacity. Indeed it is 
interesting to note that of all countries in the Paarlberg study, it is arguably the one that 
has done most to build up an independent (of donors) biotechnology capacity (China) 
that has done most to promote the sensible use of GM crops for development. Fourthly, 
developing countries need to do more at Higher Education level to provide their 
scientists with an understanding of the social and economic contexts within which 
biotechnology is likely to develop. So fundamental is this technology to practically every 
avenue in modern life, that training the current generation of students solely in narrow 
areas of relevant disciplines (like molecular genetics, for example), is certain to produce 
graduates that have great difficulty in providing the necessary advice to policy makers. 
 
All this is not say that progress is not being made. The intense dialogue surrounding the 
drafting of the Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention (signed finally in 
Cartagena in January 2000) shows that countries can certainly get their act together 
when it comes to international policy. In this case the big debate took place between two 
major blocs; the so-called Miami group of countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Uruguay and the USA) and the Like-minded group of developing countries and NGOs. 
The former group felt they had most to lose in terms of trade and were much less willing 
to agree to a restrictive protocol than the latter group. It was able to “water down 
labelling requirements and succeed in that the protocol applies only to LMOs so that no 
segregation is required for non-living GM organisms”23. However, the very fact that the 
Like-minded group were unsuccessful here may well reflect their weaker capacity to 
argue what must have been a complex case at that event. 
 
VI Concluding Comments 
 
This paper has been written as a contribution to current debates about biotechnology 
policy in and for Third World countries. Inevitably it has set out the issue in relatively 
simple terms and readers are encouraged to consult the cited texts and other sources for 
more detailed discussion of the issues. However, not only is biotechnology now evolving 
very rapidly, it is almost certainly going to play a fundamental role in future development 
policies in both developed and developing countries. It promises immense gains in food 
security, environmental protection, agriculture, health and industrial production. But it 
                                                 
22 See Essegbey et al. [23] The donor in this case was the UK bilateral agency DFID. 
23 Tait and Bruce Op. cit. p. 107. 
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also interferes with living processes in ways, and to degrees that have never occurred 
before in human history. We simply do not know what the impacts will be, how widely 
spread and with what effects. Moreover the advent of third generation biotechnology has 
raised ethical issues that are deeply felt by people and organisations at all levels. All the 
more reason, therefore, to approach associated public policy analysis with as much 
dispassion and objectivity as possible. Our suggestion is that decision-making in this 
sphere should not rest solely upon narrow instruments of decision-making as 
conventionally understood. Instead governments must establish new initiatives, 
capabilities and institutions that can have a profound effect on legitimacy at a much 
more fundamental level. Only when this is done will biotechnology in Third World have 
the role and status it deserves. 
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Abstract  
 
This paper sets out to clarify the complex issues of risk perception and management in connection 
with biotechnology and Third World development. It summarises the main threats and promises 
associated with the technology before explaining why traditional approaches to risk are flawed 
from both a scientific and an ethical standpoint. It ends by making suggestions about how the 
precautionary principle may be made an operational tool for governments interested in ensuring 
that biotechnology leads to sustainable development. 
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